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Historians of English criminal justice administration have long asserted
that criminal prosecution in England before the second half of the
nineteenth century was overwhelmingly "private" in nature.' Before the
mid-nineteenth century, so the received wisdom goes, "prosecution was
almost invariably the sole responsibility of the victim."2 As the subject's
leading historian has observed, "the typical prosecution" in England in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century was "at the initiative of a private
citizen who was the victim of a crime and who conducted the prosecution
in almost all cases."3 Indeed, Parliament did not even establish a public
prosecutor's office until 1879, and, thereafter, the office only gradually
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1. See, e.g., DAVID BENTLEY, ENGLISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 7
(1998) ("The prosecution of criminals was in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century regarded as a
private rather than a public responsibility, a matter for the victim." (citation omitted)); JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 155 (London,
Macmillan 1863) ("[T]he collection ... and preparation of the evidence to be produced at the trial...
is in England left entirely in the hands of the attorney for the prosecution . . . [who] is in no sense of
the word a public officer"); Douglas Hay, The Criminal Prosecution in England and Its Historians, 47
MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) ("The role of the private prosecutor was overwhelmingly important in
practice as well as in theory until well into the nineteenth century.").
2. Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder, Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850: Policing, Private
Prosecution, and the State, in POLICING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, at 3, 18 (Douglas
Hay & Francis Snyder eds., 1989).
3. Douglas Hay, Controlling the English Prosecutor, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 165, 168 (1983)
(emphasis added).
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assumed prosecutorial responsibilities in a small subset of criminal cases.4
Considered from a comparative perspective, England's apparent
disinterest in public prosecution before the second half of the nineteenth
century appears strikingly anomalous. By 1800, countries on the European
Continent had long come to rely on public officials to investigate and
conduct criminal cases.5 Even within Britain itself, public prosecution
existed by the early years of the nineteenth century: in Scotland, by that
time, an official known as the "Procurator Fiscal" essentially
"monopolized all serious criminal prosecutions."6 And in the United
States, which adopted the principal aspects of English criminal law and
procedure, states, counties, and cities routinely relied upon public
prosecutors to investigate, manage, and argue a broad range of criminal
cases by the early years of the nineteenth century.7
Most commentators have attributed England's comparatively late
development of public prosecution to a seemingly exceptional national
commitment to civil liberties. As early as 1863, in reflecting on "the
4. The Prosecution of Offences Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 22, authorized the creation of an
office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). On the act's immediate legislative origins, see
Philip B. Kurland & D.W.M. Waters, Public Prosecutions in England, 1854-79: An Essay in English
Legislative History, 1959 DUKE L.J. 493, 550-59. The DPP was originally viewed as an "advisory"
body. See A.H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1750-1850, at
228 (1980). As late as the 1950s, "[tihe Director's cases amount[ed] only to about 8 per cent of the
total number of prosecutions for indictable offenses." PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
tN ENGLAND 24 (1958).
5. "In Continental procedural systems, . . . the work of investigation and prosecution became a
public and judicial function in the later Middle Ages." John H. Langbein, The Prosecutorial Origins of
Defence Counsel in the Eighteenth Century: The Appearance of Solicitors, 58 CAMB. L.J. 314, 324
(1999). Writing in 1883, Stephen observed as follows:
In most countries the duty of making a preliminary investigation into the circumstances of an
offence, collecting evidence for the trial, and managing the case in court, is in the hands of
public officers. Throughout the Continent officers are to be found answering more or less to the
French Procureur G~nral, Procureur de la Rpublique, and Juge d Instruction. Even in
Scotland the Procurator Fiscal and his officers have somewhat analogous duties . . . . In
England, . . . the prosecution of offences is left entirely to private persons, or to public officers
who act in their capacity of private persons and who have hardly any legal powers beyond those
which belong to private persons.
I JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 493 (London,
Macmillan 1883).
6. Hay & Snyder, supra note 2, at 28.
7. In 1817, for example, New York's district attorney, Hugh Maxwell, prosecuted cases at the
city's Court of General Sessions involving persons accused of burglary, highway robbery, grand
larceny, forgery, "keeping a disorderly house," and "bull-baiting," among other crimes. See THE NEW-
YORK CITY-HALL RECORDER, FOR THE YEAR 1817 passim (New York, Charles N. Baldwin 1817).
Studies addressing the historical functions and practices of public prosecutors in America include
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 19-83
(2003); Carolyn Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public " Prosecutors in Historical Perspective,
39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309 (2002); and Comment, The District Attorney-A Historical Puzzle, 1952
WiS. L. REV. 125. Although public prosecutors in early nineteenth-century America possessed
considerable power, they did not monopolize the conduct of criminal prosecutions in all jurisdictions.
In Philadelphia, for example, private prosecution played an important role in the city's criminal justice
administration into the latter half of the nineteenth century. See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, at 38 (1989) ("During the first
half of the nineteenth century, private prosecution dominated criminal justice in Philadelphia.").
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absence of a public prosecutor" in England, James Fitzjames Stephen
proclaimed that the French system of prosecution, which relied upon
"elaborate inquiry" by professional police and magistrates prior to trial,
"would never be endured" by the English.8 Writing in 1983, Douglas Hay
surmised that the "attachment" of English political elites to private
prosecution "probably derived above all from their abhorrence of the
altemative"-namely, "state prosecution." 9 More recently, Allyson May
has claimed that "[a]n historic, deep-rooted mistrust of an authoritarian
state, and fear of abuses of state power . . .explains why criminal
prosecutions [in England] remained in the hands of private individuals
well into the nineteenth century."'"
Yet the delayed emergence in England of an official system of public
prosecution until the latter half of the nineteenth century remains a
historical puzzle." Between 1750 and 1850, England's central government
undertook a series of ambitious initiatives in criminal justice
administration that altered the nation's substantive criminal law,
transformed the organization of the police and magistracy, and authorized
the construction of houses of correction and, later, penitentiaries.' Yet
despite such developments, Parliament failed to enact legislation creating
an official prosecutorial office until the last quarter of the nineteenth
century-this, despite decades of persistent and vocal lobbying.1' In the
8. STEPHEN, supra note 1, at 169-70.
9. Hay, supra note 3, at 171; accord Hay, supra note 1, at 10 (describing the "strongly-held belief
. that private prosecution was an essential constitutional safeguard against possible executive
tyranny, a belief which served to preserve in England the right of prosecution relatively unimpaired
into the twentieth century"); Hay & Snyder, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that the English traditionally
attached "constitutional significance" to the belief that "prosecutions were almost entirely left to the
victim of crime.").
10. Allyson May, Advocates and Truth-Seeking in the Old Bailey Courtroom, 26 J. LEG. HIST. 71,
76-77 (2005).
11. See John H. Langbein, Response, 26 J. LEG. HIST. 85, 87 (2005) ("The deep puzzle is why the
concern about civil liberties... was so much more salient in England than on the Continent.").
12. On changes in the substantive criminal law during this period, see, for example, I LEON
RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 497-
607 (1948); Randall McGowen, Making the Bloody Code? Forgery Legislation in Eighteenth-Century
England, in LAW, CRIME AND ENGLISH SOCIETY 1660-1840, at 117 (Norma Landau ed., 2002); and
Bruce P. Smith, The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850, 23 LAW & HIST.
REV. 133, 154-59 (2005). For developments in policing, see, for example, ANDREW T. HARRIS,
POLICING THE CITY: CRIME AND LEGAL AUTHORITY IN LONDON, 1780-1840 (2004); and ELAINE
REYNOLDS, BEFORE THE BOBBIES: THE NIGHT WATCH AND POLICE REFORM IN METROPOLITAN
LONDON, 1720-1830 (1998). For treatments of English penal institutions in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1978); Simon Devereaux, The Making of the Penitentiary Act 1775-1779,
42 HIST. J. 405 (1999); George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235 (1995);
Joanna Innes, Prisons for the Poor: English Bridewells, 1555-1800, in LABOUR, LAW AND CRIME: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 42, 77-101 (Francis Snyder & Douglas Hay eds., 1987); and Randall
McGowen, Prison Reform in England, 1780-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 79
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds. 1995).
13. As early as the 1790s, leading public officials in England had argued for the establishment of
public prosecutors. See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW POLICE IN THE METROPOLIS &C. AND THE
Smith
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absence of a public prosecutor's office, victims of crime who sought to
prosecute offenses in the higher courts managed as best they could,
defraying the costs of prosecution (including private counsel, when
retained) by banding together in "prosecution societies" or seeking
governmental subsidies.14 In short, in the higher courts, as Peter King has
succinctly observed, "[i]f the victim refused to react, the judicial system
remained inert and ineffective."' 5
Yet while private victims typically provided the necessary impetus for
prosecuting cases of felony in the higher courts, this Article argues that
public officials in London between roughly 1790 and 1850 played
considerable (and considerably underappreciated) roles in prosecuting
cases of misdemeanor in the city's lower criminal courts. In the "police
offices" of the metropolis, established throughout London in 1792,
persons suspected of petty theft were, in fact, routinely arrested,
prosecuted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in ways that dispensed with the
involvement of private victims altogether. In many such cases, public
officials rather than private victims carried out the essential investigative
and forensic tasks of criminal prosecution.
For reasons that we will explore, proceedings in the police offices of
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London have rarely occupied
the attention of historians. 16 But we cannot understand English criminal
justice administration between 1790 and 1850 or the nature of the English
state's involvement in criminal prosecution during this period unless we
shed more light on the criminal procedure used in the metropolitan police
offices. As I have argued elsewhere, summary (i.e., nonjury) proceedings
in the police offices permitted criminal justice administrators confronted
CONVICT ESTABLISHMENT 76 (London, R. Shaw 1799). In the 1820s, Sir Robert Peel observed in the
House of Commons that, if Parliament "were legislating de novo, without reference to previous
customs and formed habits," it should "not hesitate to relieve private individuals from the charge of
prosecution in the case of criminal offences justly called by writers upon law-Public Wrongs." 3
RADZINOWICZ, supra note 12, at 259 n.2 (emphasis added). Agitation for the establishment of public
prosecutors continued into the 1850s, when a parliamentary subcommittee recommended that some
form of public prosecution be established. HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMM. ON PUB.
PROSECUTORS, REPORT (1856). For discussions of the debates surrounding the issue, see CLIVE
EMSLEY, CRIME AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 1750-1900, at 194-97 (3d ed. 2005); W.R. Cornish,
Defects in Prosecuting-Professional Views in 1845, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 305 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1978); Hay & Snyder, supra note 2, at
37; and May, supra note 10.
14. On the payment of costs to private prosecutors, see J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN
ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 41-48 (1986). On prosecution associations, see id. at 48-50; P.J.R. King,
Prosecution Associations and Their Impact in Eighteenth-Century Essex, in POLICING AND
PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, supra note 2, at 171; and David Philips, Good Men To Associate
and Bad Men To Conspire: Associations for the Prosecution of Felons in England, 1760-1860, in
POLICING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, supra note 2, at 113.
15. PETER J. KING, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND DISCRETION IN ENGLAND, 1740-1820, at 17 (2001) ("It
was the victim who provided the momentum, the driving force that moved a dispute towards a trial in
the major courts.").
16. As King has observed, "Misdeameanour and summary justice are still relatively
understudied." Id. at 5 n.10.
[Vol 18:29
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with cases of suspected theft to avoid several evidentiary pitfalls
associated with trials for theft-related felonies in the higher courts. 7 This
Article argues that summary proceedings in the metropolitan police offices
in theft-related cases also frequently dispensed with those individuals long
considered virtually indispensable to the prosecution of property-related
offenses: private victims themselves.
My argument proceeds in six parts. Part I describes a "classic" case of
private prosecution at the Old Bailey (London's main criminal court for
the trial of felony offenses) in the late eighteenth century. Part II argues
that the system of private prosecution relied upon at the Old Bailey in
theft-related cases confronted several pitfalls, ranging from difficulties in
detecting the commission of offenses, to the disinclination of victims to
prosecute, to the hurdles of securing favorable decisions from grand and
trial juries. Part III shifts the discussion to the metropolitan police offices,
demonstrating how cases of petty theft could be investigated, initiated, and
conducted by public officials associated with those institutions even in
instances where victims of theft could not be identified at all. Part IV
demonstrates how summary proceedings in the police offices in cases of
suspected theft addressed each of the pitfalls inherent in England's system
of private prosecution for felony previously identified in Part II. Part V
then seeks to identify the extent to which public prosecution in the police
offices characterized criminal justice administration in London before
1850 and to outline the reasons why historians have failed to acknowledge
the existence of this distinctive mode of prosecution for so long. Part VI
concludes by reflecting on the implications of the Article's findings for
our understanding of English criminal justice administration in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
I. PRIVATE PROSECUTION AT THE OLD BAILEY
Prominent studies of English criminal justice administration in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century agree that private prosecutors
essentially monopolized the system of criminal prosecution, especially in
cases involving allegations of theft. As Hay has observed, the prosecution
of "virtually all thefts" in England before 1850 was "left to the general
public. ,1 8 Similarly, in his pioneering study of English criminal justice
administration in Sussex and Surrey from 1660 to 1800, John Beattie
concluded that "[o]nly in rare cases" did appointed constables "actively
17. Smith, supra note 12.
18. "That meant that responsibility for the ... entire conduct of the prosecution was thrown on
the victim or his or her family." Hay & Snyder, supra note 2, at 23. In his research on late eighteenth-
century Staffordshire, Hay determined that constables prosecuted "[a] few" cases involving "theft
against individuals" in each decade, but that such cases were "probably special." Id. at 21.
5
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prosecute offenses against property."' 9 And, most recently, Peter King has
determined from his exhaustive study of criminal justice administration in
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Essex that law enforcement
officials "only took responsibility for prosecutions involving property
appropriation in very exceptional circumstances, such as major coining or
forgery cases.""
The virtually universal understanding that private victims monopolized
the prosecution of offenses against property in England before the mid-
nineteenth century can be illustrated by a paradigmatic case tried at the
Old Bailey in the early 1790s. On the morning of July 11, 1793, Granville
Sharp-abolitionist,2 legal theorist, 22 parliamentary reformer, 23 linguist,24
and amateur inventor25-had his silk handkerchief stolen from his pocket
while walking up London's Chancery Lane. Initially, Sharp had failed to
detect the loss, preoccupied as he was with "looking in [his] pocket book
for a memorandum., 26 But the alleged perpetrators-George Wightman,
19. BEATTLE, supra note 14, at 35; accord Hay & Snyder, supra note 2, at 21 (noting that
"although parish constables ... prosecut[ed] a small proportion of cases, ... [such cases] very rarely
concerned theft against individuals.").
20. KING, supra note 15, at 17.
21. The leading force in the English anti-slavery movement from the late-I 760s until his death in
1813, Sharp co-founded the Society (originally, the Committee) for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in
1787. On Sharp's abolitionist activities, see generally EDWARD CHARLES PONSONBY LASCELLES,
GRANVILLE SHARP AND THE FREEDOM OF THE SLAVES IN ENGLAND (1928).
22. See, e.g., GRANVILLE SHARP, A TRACT ON DUELLING: WHEREIN THE OPINIONS OF SOME OF
THE MOST CELEBRATED WRITERS ON CROWN LAW ARE EXAMINED AND CORRECTED (2d ed. London,
printed for B. White & C. Dilly 1790).
23. See, e.g., GRANVILLE SHARP, A DECLARATION OF THE PEOPLE'S NATURAL RIGHT TO A
SHARE IN THE LEGISLATURE; WHICH IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION OF STATE (London, printed for B. White 1775).
24. See, e.g., GRANVILLE SHARP, AN ENGLISH ALPHABET, FOR THE USE OF FOREIGNERS:
WHEREIN THE PRONUNCIATION OF THE VOWELS, OR VOICE-LETrERS, Is EXPLAINED IN TWELVE
SHORT GENERAL RULES, WITH THEIR SEVERAL EXCEPTIONS, AS ABRIDGED (FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF
OMAI) FROM A LARGER WORK (London, J.W. Galabin 1786) (setting forth rules designed to teach
English to a Tahitian brought to Britain in 1774); GRANVILLE SHARP, REMARKS ON THE USES OF THE
DEFINITIVE ARTICLE IN THE GREEK TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT; CONTAINING MANY NEW PROOFS
OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST FROM PASSAGES WHICH ARE WRONGLY TRANSLATED IN THE COMMON
ENGLISH VERSION (Durham, L. Pennington 1798) (analyzing aspects of Greek grammar and
articulating what has come to be known as "Sharp's Rule").
25. In the late-I 790s, Sharp offered the War Office the concept for a primitive form of "bullet-
proof vest," consisting of a bale of wool designed to deflect musket shots. For biographical details, see
PRINCE HOARE, MEMOIRS OF GRANVILLE SHARP, ESQ.: COMPOSED FROM HIS OWN MANUSCRIPTS
AND OTHER AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION OF HIS FAMILY AND OF THE AFRICAN
INSTITUTION BY PRINCE HOARE; WITH OBSERVATIONS ON MR. SHARP'S BIBLICAL CRITICISMS, BY
THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S (London, printed for H. Coburn 1820).
26. George Wightman and George Mackay, Old Bailey Proceedings Online (Sept. 11, 1793)
(t 17930911-14). During the period addressed by this Article, accounts of trials at London's Old Bailey
were published under titles such as The Whole Proceedings on the King's Commission of the Peace,
Oyer and Terminer, and Gaol Delivery for the City of London and also the Gaol Delivery for the
County of Middlesex Held at Justice Hall in the Old Bailey, and are commonly referred to as the Old
Bailey Sessions Papers (OBSP). This Article cites to the accounts available through the Old Bailey
Proceedings Online [hereinafter OBP], a digital archive of surviving editions of the OBSP currently
covering the period from 1674 to 1834. See The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, London 1674 to 1834,
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an eighteen-year-old, and George Mackay, a youth of fourteen-were
spotted by a roving constable, who had initially seen the boys at the corner
of Chancery Lane and Fleet Street. After suspecting the two boys of
mischief, seeing Mackay approach "close to" Sharp, and then spotting
Wightman run away shortly thereafter "with [a] handkerchief in his hand,"
the constable chased down Wightman, grabbed him "by the collar," and
picked up a handkerchief that the boy had tossed into the street.
Approached by the arresting officer, Sharp checked his pocket and
confirmed that his property was missing. After the constable noted that the
handkerchief that he had retrieved was stitched with the initials "G.S.," the
officer duly pocketed the evidence so that it could be produced at trial
should Sharp elect to prosecute the two youths.27
Sharp did so, and the suspects appeared at the Old Bailey two months
later to answer an indictment for petty larceny.28 In the courtroom, Sharp
and the arresting officer, unaided by counsel, briefly narrated their stories
under oath.29 In response, the two suspects, unrepresented by counsel3°
and unsworn,3 fended for themselves as best they could. Mackay stated
flatly that he had never seen his codefendant before the time of their
arrests. Wightman, for his part, claimed that he had found the
handkerchief in question in the street but, with his next nervous breath,
invited the presiding judge to consider sending him into service as "a
soldier or a sailor." After the jury found both defendants guilty, the judge
acceded to Wightman's request: the two newly minted convicts were
"Sent to Sea," there to serve as cannon fodder in England's undermanned
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org (July 2005). References to the OBP include the name(s) of the
defendant(s), the date of the proceeding, and the OBP reference.
27. Wightman and Mackay, OBP, supra note 26.
28. In theory, picking pockets fell within the legal category of "stealing privately from the
person"-an offense ostensibly punishable by death. However, as Beattie has observed, the offense of
"stealing privately" appears to have been rarely prosecuted in the eighteenth century, likely because of
difficulties associated with detecting its commission. Even when prosecuted, moreover, the offense
"was not universally regarded . . . as deserving of hanging." BEATTIE, supra, note 14, at 423. By
contrast, an indictment that charged a defendant with petty larceny-the theft of goods valued at less
than a shilling-eliminated the prospect of a capital sentence. Id. at 182.
29. Lawyers representing victims in cases of felony first appeared at the Old Bailey in the 1710s.
On the emergence of prosecuting counsel at the eighteenth-century Old Bailey, see JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 145-47 (2003). By 1800, prosecuting
counsel appeared in approximately twenty-one percent of cases at the Old Bailey. See J.M. Beattie,
Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 227 tbl.1 (1991); accord ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE
OLD BAILEY, 1750-1850, at 34-35 (2003).
30. Counsel began to represent defendants accused of felonies at the Old Bailey in the 1730s. On
the entry of defense counsel, see LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 167-77. In the early years of the
nineteenth century, roughly a quarter of criminal defendants at the Old Bailey were represented by
counsel. See MAY, supra note 29, at 35 (25.7% in 1805); Beattie, supra note 29, at 227 tbl.1 (28% in
1800).
31. Although English criminal defendants were permitted to speak at trial, they could not provide
testimony under oath until 1898. See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 6; CJ.W. ALLEN,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 123-80 (1997).
2006]
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navy, then engaged in a recently declared but rapidly expanding war
against Revolutionary France. 32
To observers at the Old Bailey in the early 1790s, the case of George
Mackay and George Wightman would have appeared utterly
unremarkable-with the exception, perhaps, of its high-profile and
eccentric prosecutor.3 3 Indeed, the two young suspects had been detected,
arrested, prosecuted, tried, and sentenced in a manner completely
consistent with then current theories of how English criminal justice
administration was supposed to work. The victim (aided by a vigilant
constable, to be sure) had promptly detected that his property had gone
missing. The constable (with a bit of effort, true) had arrested the
perpetrators "red-handed." The victim, despite the trifling amount in
controversy, had opted to prosecute rather than to overlook the wrong or
reach a settlement with the suspects.34 The grand jury, which had heard
evidence only on the prosecutor's behalf, had returned a "true bill."35 The
trial jury, after hearing the testimony and viewing the handkerchief with
its tell-tale initials, had convicted the defendants-most likely, after little
or no deliberation.36 The judge, untroubled by lawyers for either side, had
entered a sentence that, in the context of an escalating and exceptionally
violent war, would address both the critical manpower needs of the
English state and incapacitate the convicts--quite possibly forever.37
32. France declared war against England in February 1793. For a discussion of the use of military
service as a criminal sentence, see S.R. Conway, The Recruitment of Criminals into the British Army,
1775-1781, 1985 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 46; and Clive Emsley, The Recruitment of Petty Offenders
During the French Wars, 1793-1815, 66 MARINER'S MIRROR 199 (1980). For the use of pre-trial
enlistment as a method of avoiding trial altogether, see Peter King, War as a Judicial Resource: Press
Gangs and Prosecution Rates, 1740-1830, in LAW, CRIME AND ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1660-1840, supra
note 12, at 97.
33. Even here, onlookers would probably not have been surprised. Then, as now, prominent
social status was no protection against victimization. As a fifteen-year-old, the future Home Secretary
and Prime Minister Robert Banks Jenkinson was robbed of his watch on the road from London to
Kent, and highway robbers targeted three other future Home Secretaries, as well as the prominent
politicians Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox. See Simon Devereaux, Convicts and the State: The
Administration of Criminal Justice in Great Britain during the Reign of George III, at 1-3 (1997)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto) (observing that "[t]he list could be extended")
(on file with author).
34. The handkerchief had been valued at 6 p, less than £2 in modem-day terms. See Lawrence H.
Officer, Comparing the Purchasing Power of Money in Great Britain from 1264 to 2002, Economic
History Services, 2004, http://www.eh.net/hmit/ppowerbp (equating 6 p in 1793 with £1.71 in 2002)
(last visited Dec. 13, 2005).
35. On eighteenth-century grand jury practice, see LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 45.
36. Trial jurors did not even sit together in the same section of the Old Bailey's courtroom until
1738, and deliberations thereafter were usually exceedingly brief. See id. at 21-25.
37. On a per capita basis, more Britons died in the French Revolutionary Wars than in any other
military conflict in British history. See generally CLIVE EMSLEY, BRITISH SOCIETY AND THE FRENCH
WARS, 1793-1815 (1979). As contemporary depictions attest, those veterans who did manage to return
to England often lacked the nimble hands and speedy feet necessary for successful pickpocketing: the
devastating effects of cannon shot and "reforms" in surgical technique rendered wartime amputations
common. For a particularly graphic treatment, see G.J. GUTHRIE, A TREATISE ON GUN-SHOT
WOUNDS, ON INJURIES OF NERVES, AND ON WOUNDS OF THE EXTREMITIES REQUIRING THE
DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF AMPUTATION (2d ed. London, Burgess & Hill 1820) (recording the
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Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, the case of Mackay and
Wightman also comports with our modem-day scholarly understanding of
criminal prosecution in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
England: the private victim of the theft-not a public prosecutor-bore
the responsibility for initiating and managing the prosecution.
To be sure, public officials performed certain aspects of the two
principal tasks of modem-day prosecutors: the investigation of crimes and
the presentation of evidence to the ultimate fact-finder.38 Before trial, as
Sharp's prosecution of the two young pickpocketers suggests, constables
could play an important role in arresting suspects and investigating
offenses.39 In turn, statutes dating from the 1550s required justices of the
peace (JPs), in cases of felony, to compile statements from the accused,
the complainant, and material witnesses and to bind over these individuals
to appear at trial in the higher courts.4 °
At trial, a variety of public officials might assume forensic roles in
presenting evidence. For example, the law officers of the crown
traditionally tried cases, such as treason, deemed to affect the critical
interests of the state. 4' From time to time, the Solicitor-General conducted
the trials of persons indicted for notorious crimes of violence.42 Several
governmental and quasi-governmental entities-including the Mint, the
Bank of England, the Post Office, and the Treasury-employed officials
"whose responsibility included investigating and prosecuting criminal
cases on behalf of the department. 4 3 In turn, magistrates (or their clerks)
periodically appeared at the Old Bailey to authenticate confessions or
opinions and practice of British Army surgeons near the end of the Napoleonic Wars). For depictions
of amputee veterans (or those claiming to be), see Bruce P. Smith, Circumventing the Jury: Petty
Crime and Summary Jurisdiction in London and New York City, 1790-1855, at 251-61 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with Sterling Library, Yale University).
38. The articulation of the "investigatory" and "forensic" functions of modem-day prosecutors is
taken from John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 313 (1973).
39. In the case of Mackay and Wightman, the arresting constable also testified at trial. See supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
40. On the pair of statutes that governed magistrates' committal and bail proceedings, see JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE (1974).
41. See, e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 104 ("In crimes of state the law officers of the crown
and their hirelings had been little better than henchman; in cases of ordinary crime the investigating
and charging functions remained largely privatized, in the hands of the victim. Thus, the English had
scant experience upon which to draw for constructing a system of impartial public prosecution.").
42. In 1798, for example, the Solicitor-General conducted the prosecution of one James Eyres,
accused of murdering an individual associated with the Thames Police Office in a riot outside the
office. See James Eyres, OBP (Jan. 9, 1799) (t17990109-5). In the early decades of the nineteenth
century, magistrates in London occasionally conferred with the Home Office about the desirability of
engaging lawyers to prosecute cases in the higher courts. In September 1830, for example, the police
magistrate R.E. Broughton suggested to the Home Office that a "long and intricate" case be
"conducted at the public Expence." Broughton to Home Office (Sept. 6, 1830), National Archives
(NA): HO 59/2.
43. LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 113; see also Hay, supra note 3, at 167; Randall McGowen, The
Bank of England and the Policing of Forgery, 1797-1821, 186 PAST & PRESENT 81 (2005).
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vouch for their voluntariness." Finally, by the 1840s and 1850s, through a
series of developments whose history remains only dimly understood,
police officers in England's major cities had assumed increasing
responsibility for the conduct of criminal prosecutions in the higher
courts.4 5
It is clear, therefore, that public officials contributed in important ways
to England's so-called system of "private" prosecution well before the
mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, three decades ago, John Langbein argued
that the "origins" of public prosecution in England could be traced to the
sixteenth century, when, in Langbein's view, English magistrates "became
the ordinary public prosecutors in cases of serious crime. 46 According to
Langbein, early modern JPs not only investigated cases prior to trial, as
required by the Marian bail and committal statutes of 1554-55, but also
served as "back-up prosecutors" when "private accusers" failed to appear
at trial or when evidence "was not going to be sufficient., 47 If, as
Langbein contends, one should look to the mid-sixteenth century for the
"origins" of public prosecution in England, how can this Article suggest
that public prosecution only "emerged" in the nation's largest city 250
years later?
The answer lies in the limited range of tasks performed by English
public officials at trial compared to those dispatched by modern-day
criminal prosecutors. Even with respect to the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, where Langbein identifies periodic magisterial involvement at
trial, historians have questioned whether magistrates routinely served as
prosecutors in the higher courts.48 By the eighteenth century, the forensic
44. See, e.g., Robert Davidson, OBP (Nov. 30, 1796) (t17961130-61); Samuel Mitchell, OBP
(Jan. 9, 1805) (t18050109-10); William Skinn and Joshua Brown, OBP (Jan. 10, 1810) (t1810011-52).
45. Writing in 1984, Hay observed that "[o]ur findings about the role of the police in prosecutions
in the nineteenth century are still, surprisingly, not very far advanced." Hay, supra note 1, at 9. For
preliminary assessments of the prosecutorial roles played by the English police by the mid-nineteenth
century, see DAVID PHILIPS, CRIME AND AUTHORITY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE BLACK COUNTRY,
1835-1860, at 125 tbls.13(c) & 129-30 (1977) (arguing that police forces in Staffordshire and
Worcestershire established between 1835 and 1860 involved themselves in prosecution "more
regularly and systematically" than had previous officials); Jennifer S. Davis, Prosecutions and Their
Context: The Use of the Criminal Law in Later Nineteenth-Century London, in POLICING AND
PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, supra note 2, at 397, 420 (noting that "by the 1870s, the police
[in London] were ... involved in the majority of all [prosecuted] thefts"); and Hay & Snyder, supra
note 2, at 4 ("[T]he new [police] forces already in existence in London and other parts of the country
were emerging [by the 1850s] as de facto public prosecutors, although the law, for most purposes,
regarded the prosecuting policeman as simply another private citizen.").
46. Langbein, supra note 38, at 313; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 40, at 35-39.
47. Langbein observes as follows:
In this way the Marian scheme was making the JPs into back-up prosecutors. Private citizens...
would continue to prosecute most cases. But when there were no private accusers, or when their
evidence was not going to be sufficient, it was the JP who would investigate, bind witnesses,
and appear at assizes to orchestrate prosecution.
Langbein, supra note 38, at 323.
48. For discussion of the extent to which JPs assumed prosecutorial functions at trial during the
early modem period, see, for example, JOHN G. BELLAMY, CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATE
[Vol 18:29
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roles played by magistrates at the Old Bailey fell far short of those
performed by modern-day prosecutors. Although magistrates (or their
clerks) could be called upon to authenticate confessions or attest to their
voluntariness, the responsibility of "conducting the case at trial ... was
almost entirely left to the victim of the crime or his counsel."4 9 Put
differently, although magistrates and police officers by the late eighteenth
century performed prominent roles in pretrial investigation, they did not
supplant private victims with respect to the forensic role of presenting
evidence at trial.5°
In sum, through the last decade of the eighteenth century, prosecutions
of felony cases in England's higher courts (most importantly, for our
purposes, London's Old Bailey) continued to rely overwhelmingly on
private victims to initiate and manage criminal prosecutions. When
victims failed to appear at trial, judges at the Old Bailey routinely entered
dismissals." Similarly, where indictments had been drafted alleging theft
from "persons unknown," and actual victims failed to materialize by the
time of trial, judges also dismissed at high rates. 2 As we shall see in Part
II, difficulties in identifying the proper private individual responsible for
prosecuting a case at trial proved to be only one of several pitfalls facing
English criminal justice administrators.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION
At first blush, the case of Mackay and Wightman might suggest that the
detection, prosecution, and conviction of suspected thieves occurred easily
at the late eighteenth-century Old Bailey. In truth, prosecutions of theft-
related cases could easily be derailed if they encountered pitfalls in any of
a handful of critical phases: detection, arrest, case initiation, indictment,
and trial.
MEDIEVAL AND TUDOR ENGLAND 53 n.28 (1984) ("Langbein's case that the justice of the peace who
committed the suspect was the government's chief prosecuting agent is ... overstated. I am doubtful
about justices of the peace being ready 'to assume where necessary the forensic role of prosecutor at
trial."') (quoting LANGBEIN, supra note 40, at 35); and J.S. COCKBURN, CALENDAR OF ASSIZE
RECORDS: HOME CIRCUIT INDICTMENTS ELIZABETH I AND JAMES 1: INTRODUCTION 100-01 (1985)
("The justices' duties ... clearly included the general supervision of preliminary investigation ....
What is not clear is whether or not magisterial initiative extended to the organization of a formal
prosecution at [the] assizes.").
49. Hay & Snyder, supra note 2, at 24.
50. In one case, a barrister appeared at trial to conduct the prosecution on behalf of the victim.
When the victim failed to appear, the case was dismissed. James M'Coul and William Osland, 013P
(Sept. 14, 1796) (t17960914-75) ("The case was opened by Mr. Const, but the prosecutor not
appearing when called, his recognizance was ordered to be estreated.").
51. See, e.g., Edward Grove, OBP (Sept. 15, 1790) (t17900915-2) (prisoner indicted for stealing
"half boots" acquitted after victim and witness failed to appear); James Stow and Langley White, OBP
(Jan. 9, 1793) (t17930109-43) (prisoners indicted for stealing leather breeches and shirt acquitted after
victim and witnesses failed to appear); Isaac Warren, OBP (Nov. 30, 1796) (t17961130-9) (prisoner
indicted for stealing a half crown found "not guilty" after victim failed to appear).
52. See infra Part II. But see text accompanying notes 148-149.
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A. Detection
As Sharp's experiences on the streets of London illustrate, even sober
and meticulous property owners, if temporarily distracted, might find it
difficult to detect the loss of their personal items. When the faculties of
victims were impaired-if, for example, they were asleep or drunk-even
those crimes that required perpetrators to be in close physical proximity to
their victims might prove difficult to detect. 3
Of course, many thefts occurred far from the individuals whose property
was targeted. Persons intent on appropriating items from boats and
warehouses on the Thames frequently focused on bulk items held in
storage such as hemp, tobacco, rum, sugar, rope, coal, and metal whose
loss would be difficult for property owners to detect. 4 Likewise, the many
building sites of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London proved
easy targets for opportunistic thieves. Lead pipes and gutters could be
reached by persons willing to climb walls or traverse roofs; metal could be
removed from buildings by bending, twisting, or cutting; and scraps that
had been removed could be melted in a modest fire, rendering them
incapable of identification by their owners. 55
Although manufacturing and warehousing facilities could hire
employees charged with thwarting misappropriation, the nature of the
goods stored in such facilities and the goods' close proximity to other
workers could make detection difficult. 6 The prospects of detecting thefts
53. At least so much is suggested by the frequent victimization of persons who consorted with
prostitutes.
54. For discussions of appropriation from boats, docks, and wharves on the Thames, see PATRICK
COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE COMMERCE AND POLICE OF THE RIVER THAMES (Patterson Smith
ed. 1969) (1800); PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 390-96 (2d ed. 2003); and R.J.B. Knight, Pilfering and Theft from the
Dockyards at the Time of the American War of Independence, 61 MARINER'S MIRROR 215 (1975).
Cynthia Herrup has identified similar challenges in seventeenth-century Sussex:
The ubiquity of the goods routinely stolen meant that the knowledge of the searchers about the
property was often crucial to identifying stolen goods. A constable alone could make little
progress trying to find items as common as sheep or grain, particularly if the recoverable
evidence was no longer in its original form, but had been transmuted into a leg of mutton or a
loaf of bread.
Cynthia Herrup, New Shoes and Mutton Pies: Investigative Responses to Theft in Seventeenth-Century
East Sussex, 27 HIST. J. 811, 820 (1984) [hereinafter Herrup, Investigative Responses]; see also
CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, THE COMMON PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 79 (1987) (noting that "identification of stolen articles was a
persistent problem").
55. See Bruce P. Smith, Metal Theft and the Law in London, 1750-1850 (July 15, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
56. As John Styles' study of embezzlement in the eighteenth-century English woolen industry
demonstrates, medium-sized yarn manufacturers in Georgian Yorkshire could handle 6,000 pounds of
yam each year, making it extremely difficult for them to detect petty pilfering by the many out-
workers typically employed in the manufacturing process. Although wool masters might compare the
weight of finished yarn against that of the raw materials supplied to their workers, workers who had
pilfered quantities of wool learned to increase the weight of the finished product that they returned by
"throwing the wool upon wet stones," "adding oil to make up the weight," or "steaming the [yam]
[Vol 18:29
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in settings that were less actively monitored, such as building sites,
moored boats, or market gardens, must have been even more remote. And
if darkness and isolation themselves were not sufficient to stifle detection,
individuals who purloined cargo could readily transfer their contraband
from the marked containers in which the original goods had been stored
into bags that had been "previously dyed black" to obliterate any
identifying marks.57 Like today, the so-called "dark figure" of undetected
theft appears to have been considerable.5
B. Arrest
Of course, persons who appropriated goods did not merely need to
avoid detection by property owners. Theoretically, constables and
watchmen possessed broad powers to arrest individuals suspected of
committing felonies, including various types of theft. The Constable's
Assistant, a manual for English constables published in 1808, instructed its
readers that, in cases of felony, they should not only "give the earliest
information in [their] power to the Magistrate, but also . . . use [their]
utmost endeavours to apprehend the offender, without waiting for a
warrant, and to keep him in safe custody till he can be carried before a
Justice of the Peace."59 Although such guidebooks cannot be relied upon
as literal descriptions of actual policing practices, recent studies have
revealed that London-area constables and watchmen were considerably
more zealous and more able than early historians had acknowledged, and
that they demonstrated their abilities well before Parliament placed the
metropolitan police on a centralized, professional footing in 1829.60
With this said, the common law, at least in theory, imposed certain
limitations on the powers of officers in the area of arrest. First, like
property owners themselves, constables confronted the definitional
complexity of the English law of larceny. For example, as The Constable 's
Assistant advised, the common law of larceny traditionally did not
encompass "things that adhere[d] to the freehold" (i.e., fixtures);
accordingly, "corn, grass, trees, lead upon a house, rails in a yard, and the
over a boiling pot." John Styles, Embezzlement, Industry and the Law in England, 1500-1800, in
MANUFACTURE IN TOWN AND COUNTRY BEFORE THE FACTORY 175 (Maxine Berg et al. eds., 1983).
57. COLQUHOUN,supra note 54, at 57.
58. For reflections on the "dark figure" of theft, see V.A.C. Gatrell, The Decline of Theft and
Violence in Victorian and Edwardian England, in CRIME AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF
CRIME IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1500, at 238, 238-70 (V.A.C. Gatrell et al. eds., 1980).
59. [SOC'Y FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF VICE], THE CONSTABLE'S ASSISTANT: BEING A
COMPENDIUM OF THE DUTIES AND POWERS OF CONSTABLES, AND OTHER PEACE OFFICERS; CHIEFLY
AS THEY RELATE TO THE APPREHENDING OF OFFENDERS AND THE LAYING OF INFORMATIONS BEFORE
MAGISTRATES 15 (1808) [hereinafter CONSTABLE'S ASSISTANT].
60. For recent histories stressing the relative effectiveness of the police in London before 1829,
see Ruth Paley, "An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System "? Policing London Before Peel, 10
CRIM. JUST. HIST. 95 (1989), and sources cited supra at note 12.
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like" were "not the property of any one" unless "particular Acts of
Parliament ... made them so."61 Second, the common law constrained the
ability of constables to conduct searches of suspects before arrest,
depriving officers of the equivalent of what modem-day scholars refer to
as "detain and search" powers.62 Thus, for a constable who encountered a
suspicious person at night on a dark urban street, determining whether the
suspect possessed illicit contraband-whether it be twisted metal, bundled
tobacco, lumps of sugar, or skeins of yam-would have been no simple
task.
It is doubtful, of course, that the "formal" law necessarily defined the
"informal" contours of police authority.63 We surely need to know more
about the workaday practices of police officers and, to the extent possible,
their attitudes about the law to know the degree to which the formal law
actually limited their authority. But it does seem clear that officials
occasionally encountered serious problems in seeking to arrest persons
suspected of wrongdoing. In 1761, for example, John Nichols, "Rigger to
the King and the East India Company," testified to a committee of the
House of Commons about the prevalence of thefts committed by operators
of "bumboats"-small boats operated on the Thames by persons
purportedly engaged in the business of selling food to sailors. As Nichols
recounted, he had recently approached a pair of individuals in a bumboat
who were suspected of stealing rope. When approached, "the Woman
threw the Rope overboard, and told the Officer he might do his worst, for
that he could not get any Proof."64 Although we must be cautious not to
read too much into the woman's words-uttered, as they were, in the heat
of pursuit and recounted by Nichols after the fact-we should also not
ignore the likely meaning of the taunt. If Nichols could not recover the
rope tossed overboard by the suspected thieves, he would have little
chance of determining the rope's lawful owner-the person responsible
for prosecuting the case in the higher courts.
C. Case Initiation
To be sure, if a constable or night watchman did manage to arrest a
person with suspicious goods in his or her possession, an indictment could
61. CONSTABLE'S ASSISTANT, supra note 59, at 16.
62. Whether this rule operated as a significant impediment to English police officers in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries remains unclear, though interviews of police constables in
the twentieth century suggested that they understood that the limitation existed. See Glanville
Williams, Statutory Powers of Search and Arrest on the Ground of Unlawful Possession, 1960 CRIM.
L. REV. 598.
63. On this theme, see Robert Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996) (describing
differences between formal law and actual practices in policing vagrancy-type offenses in twentieth-
century Connecticut).
64. 28 H.C. JOUR. 1026 (1760-61) (emphasis added).
[Vol 18:29
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss1/2
2006]
be drafted even when a named victim could not be identified. As the legal
commentator Edward Hyde East observed in 1800, a suspect could "be
charged in the indictment with having stolen the goods of a person to the
jurors unknown., 65 However, judges routinely dismissed cases grounded
upon indictments alleging theft from "persons unknown" in instances
where victims did not appear at trial. 66
Even when victims could be identified and chose to appear before
magistrates to describe their losses, prosecutions could falter. Under the
sixteenth-century statutes that continued to guide the pretrial practices of
English magistrates until the mid-nineteenth century, victims who brought
their complaints before magistrates were required to post a bond that could
be forfeited if the complainant failed to prosecute. 67 Parliament also
sought to encourage prosecutions through the payment of costs and, in
some instances, rewards. 68 But even with such incentives in place, many
individuals victimized by theft declined to prosecute, seemingly more
interested in negotiating the return of their goods than in incurring the
expense and inconvenience associated with proceedings in the higher
courts.69 Other potential prosecutors may have been deterred by their
distaste for the stringent penalties frequently meted out in the higher
courts.7° Thus, despite the risk that a victim might forfeit his or her
recognizance, and the fact that "compounding" a felony by reaching a
settlement with the suspect was itself a punishable offense, numerous
victims of theft simply opted not to prosecute.
D. Indictment and Trial
A prosecutor who decided to bring an action in the higher courts next
faced a pair of significant challenges: obtaining a "true bill" from the
grand jury and securing a conviction from the trial jury.
In modern American law, the grand jury is a highly malleable
institution, a body largely controlled by prosecutors, except during its rare
"runaway" phases."1 In the eighteenth century, by contrast, the grand jury
65. 2 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 651 (London, A. Strahan
1803).
66. See Smith, supra note 12, at 140.
67. See supra text accompanying note 40.
68. On the payment of costs, see supra text accompanying note 14. On the reward system, see
generally BEATTIE, supra note 14, at 50-55.
69. "Uppermost in most victims' minds once the crime had been discovered was the desire to get
their goods back as quickly as possible." KING, supra note 15, at 23.
70. See, e.g., DONNA T. ANDREW & RANDALL McGOWEN, THE PERREAUS AND MRS. RUDD:
FORGERY AND BETRAYAL IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LONDON 24 (2001) ("A prosecutor might
experience uneasiness at the thought of hurrying an acquaintance to death and a sensitivity to the
judgments his neighbors might make.").
71. See, e.g., Roger T. Brice, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and
Undue Influence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 764 (1972) (emphasizing the passivity of modem-day
grand juries); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
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played an active role in screening cases alleging felony before trial. In late
eighteenth-century Surrey, for example, grand juries declined to find "true
bills" with respect to roughly seventeen percent of the indictments that
they considered.7 2 The inconvenience and costs involved in securing an
indictment-as well as the roughly one-in-six chance of failure-
represented yet another vexing hurdle in bringing a successful prosecution.
Of course, securing a "true bill" provided no assurance of success at
trial, where acquittal rates in property-related cases hovered near fifty
percent.7 3 In cases that involved the theft of commodities or other
nondescript items, prosecutions could fail if witnesses could not lay a
credible claim to the goods found in the defendant's possession.74 In 1795,
for example, Charles Fairfield was found not guilty of stealing "exotic
plants" after a witness testified that the plant found in Fairfield's
possession was "the same sort" of plant stolen from the victim, "but not
[necessarily] the same plant;" indeed, the witness expressed the view that
it was "not possible for any man living to swear to it."
75
The increased presence and activity of defense counsel at the
eighteenth-century Old Bailey only further contributed to the problems
faced by prosecutors in proving ownership of nondescript goods. For
example, in 1784, James Scott, who had been indicted for stealing forty-
four pounds of spermaceti, was acquitted after his counsel, William
Garrow, subjected the prosecution's witnesses to a withering cross-
examination concerning the precise age, shape, color, and size of the
"spermaceti cake" alleged to have been stolen from the victim. After the
court instructed the jury that it was "incumbent" on the prosecution's
witnesses not to "swear rashly" at trial to the article's purported
identification, the jury acquitted the defendant.76
CORNELL L. REv. 260 (1995) (arguing that "as currently constructed, grand juries not only do not,
but cannot, protect the accused from unfounded charges"); Ric Simmons, Re-examining the Grand
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1, 27 (2002)
(arguing that "numerous federal rules affecting the grand jury serve to turn the grand jurors into little
more than passive observers").
72. BEATTIE, supra note 14, at 401, 402 & tbl.8.1. At the quarter sessions, the figure was 16.9%;
at the assizes, the figure was 17.7%. Id.
73. According to careful quantitative studies, only about half of the persons tried in the higher
courts of late eighteenth-century England were convicted. In property-related cases tried from 1782 to
1787 in the Home Circuit (i.e., at the assize courts of Surrey, Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire, and Sussex),
trial juries delivered verdicts of not guilty in 34.1% of cases and "partial verdicts" (i.e., convictions for
an offense less than that charged in the indictment) in 12.3% of cases, suggesting a "conviction rate"
of 53.6%. See KING, supra note 15, at 232 tbl.7.2(a). In cases involving noncapital property offenses
tried at the Surrey assizes from 1660 to 1800, juries returned guilty verdicts at a rate of 45.7%. See
BEATTIE, supra note 14, at 425 tbl.8.4.
74. See Herrup, Investigative Responses, supra note 54, at 825 (characterizing proof "that the
discovered items were actually the victim's" as an "important" and "difficult" task).
75. Charles Fairfield, OBP (Sept. 16, 1795) (t17950916-73).
76. James Scott, OBP (Jan. 14, 1784) (t17840114-70).
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III. PUBLIC PROSECUTION IN THE METROPOLITAN POLICE OFFICES
For a variety of reasons, criminal justice administrators faced
considerable challenges in detecting offenses, initiating prosecutions, and
securing convictions in the vast, bustling, and increasingly anonymous
world of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London. As other
scholars have noted, such challenges led to important innovations in the
administration of criminal justice in the metropolis, including improved
policing and street lighting.77 What has not been fully appreciated is the
degree to which the endemic problem of theft in the metropolis also led to
important innovations in the realm of prosecution.
Consider, first, a pair of cases resolved by magistrates in London's
police offices in the mid-1830s. In late October 1836, Thomas Murray, a
self-described dealer in metal, appeared at the Thames Police Office on
the north side of the Thames in Wapping.78 Officers had arrested Murray
and a companion named Edward Bloxham with 400 pounds of lead in
their possession. The lead found in the possession of the pair apparently
had been "doubled up and beaten together in such size and shape as to be
carried ... under the clothes of the person conveying them," suspended
there "upon a belt fastened round the body or ... from the braces [i.e.,
suspenders] or neck."79
When Murray appeared before the magistrate in attendance at the
Thames Police Office, the magistrate instructed him to demonstrate "not
only that he had purchased" the lead found in his possession "but also that
it [had] been bought under such circumstances as would remove the
suspicion attached to it." Murray responded that he did "a deal of business
77. On the distinctive challenges faced by criminal justice administrators in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century London, see J.M. BEATTIE, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT IN LONDON, 1660-1750:
URBAN CRIME AND THE LIMITS OF TERROR 4 (2001) (observing that the "level, intensity, and range"
of offenses prosecuted in London "presented problems that exposed more clearly than elsewhere the
inadequacies of the law and the system of criminal administration"); and LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at
108 ("The problems of crime and criminality associated with the social relations of the metropolis
strained the inherited institutions of... law enforcement .... ).
78. Additional details of this and the following case are provided in Smith, supra note 12, at 149-
54.
79. A short report of the incident is contained in the Police Gazette; or, Hue and Cry (cited
hereinafter as POLICE GAZETTE), a publication associated with the police offices that contained
information on stolen property, criminal suspects and military deserters at large, appearances by
suspects, and committals by police magistrates. For further description of this source, see infra note
130. The initial entry in the Police Gazette relating to Murray's case notes as follows: "EDWARD
BLOXHAM and THOMAS MURRAY with unlawfully possessing, at Saint Giles, four hundred [pounds]
weight of lead, which had been stolen." Edward Bloxham and Thomas Murray (Thames Police Office
[PO], 1836), POLICE GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1836, NA: HO 62/18 (original capitalization retained in this
and later extracts). References to the Police Gazette include the following information: the name of the
defendant or defendants; the police office in which the proceeding occurred; the year in which the
proceeding occurred; the issue of the Police Gazette in which the proceeding is reported; and the
archival repository or published source in which the issue can be located. For additional details of
Murray's arrest, see William Ballantine & Thomas Clarkson to Samuel March Phillipps (Under-
Secretary of State for Home Affairs), Dec. 6, 1836, Thames PO Letter Book, 11 June 1834-14 July
1842, London Metropolitan Archives (LMA): PS.T/1/Letter book/3.
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in the lead trade" and that he "[could not] speak to every piece of it."8
After hearing Murray's explanation, the magistrate convicted him and
sentenced him to a five-pound fine, observing in a subsequent letter to the
Home Office that Murray had "passed very lightly over the strong points
of the case against him.",81
Several months later, the Home Office received a petition from Lewis
Leo, a self-styled "Collector of Broken Glass and Old Metal" living in
Spitalfields in eastern London. Leo requested "the return of a Cart" that
had been "forfeited" after his servant, Henry Samuels, had been convicted
summarily at the Queen's Square Police Office for "unlawful possession"
of a quantity of brass.8 2 According to Leo, when Samuels had first
appeared at the police office, the attending magistrate had adjourned the
case to give Samuels "an opportunity to produce evidence that the said
Goods were fairly and honestly purchased by him." When Samuels
appeared at the police office two days later, he claimed to have "produced
the Person from whom he had bought the said Metal." The magistrate then
examined Samuels's witness "touching the same," who claimed that the
suspect had "bought the said Metal [from] her, and also stated the person
of whom she bought the same." Despite this evidence, the magistrate
convicted Samuels and ordered him to pay a forty-shilling fine or, in
default of payment, to be "committed to the House of Correction for three
weeks." The magistrate also seized the horse and cart in which the metal
had been found.83
For our purposes, what is so profoundly striking about these two cases,
and the many others like them that were disposed of summarily in
London's police offices during this same period, is the utter absence of
private prosecutors.84 In cases in the police offices involving persons
arrested in suspicious circumstances where private victims did not appear,
the arresting officer and attending magistrate themselves monopolized the
proceedings-in so doing, dispensing with the involvement of private
victims.
The enhanced role played by public officials in the initiation and
80. Ballantine & Clarkson to Phillipps, supra note 79.
81. Reference to Murray's fine is contained in Phillipps to Thames PO, Dec. 2, 1836, Thames PO
Letter Book, 11 June 1834-14 July 1842, LMA: PS.T/1/Letter book/3. On the police magistrates'
assessment of Murray's testimony, see Ballantine & Clarkson to Phillipps, supra note 79.
82. "Petition of Lewis Leo, Praying the return of a Cart, forfeited by his servant on being
Convicted of unlawful possession of Certain Metal," Mar. 1837, NA: HO 59/8.
83. Davie Gregorie to Home Office, Mar. 6, 1837, NA: HO 59/8.
84. See, e.g., William Scott, George Glendenning, and David Side (Thames PO, 1836), POLICE
GAZETrE, Sept. 29, 1836, NA: HO: 62/18 ("WILLIAM SCOTT, GEORGE GLENDENNING, and DAVID
SIDE, with unlawfully possessing, at the Tower, fourteen pounds weight of sugar, which had been
stolen. - Convicted of a misdemeanor, and fined forty shillings each."); Francis Courtenay (Thames
PO, 1836), POLICE GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1836, NA: HO 62/18, ("FRANCIS COURTENAY, with unlawfully
possessing, at Lambeth, twenty-eight pounds weight of solder, which had been stolen. - Convicted of
a misdemeanor, and fined forty shillings.").
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disposition of petty criminal cases in London resulted from two important
developments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that
were particularly prominent in the metropolis: first, the precocious
creation of a corps of salaried magistrates and police; and, second, the
steady expansion of magistrates' summary jurisdiction over theft-related
offenses.
As early as 1740, a Middlesex JP named Thomas DeVeil had taken
upon himself the task of dispensing justice at regular hours from a "public
office" at Bow Street, Covent Garden. 85 During the succeeding tenure at
Bow Street of Henry Fielding (1748-52) and his blind half-brother John
(1754-80), the Office secured an allowance from the central government
and instituted several measures designed to aid the detection, prosecution,
and conviction of suspected offenders. These initiatives ranged from the
creation of a body of constables attached to the Office (the famous
"Runners"), to the publication of periodicals designed to spur the
apprehension of criminal suspects, to heightened coordination with
provincial magistrates concerning the apprehension of suspected
offenders.
86
In 1792, on the eve of war with revolutionary France, Parliament passed
a measure creating seven new "police" or "public" offices throughout
metropolitan London (excluding the City) designed to complement the
preexisting office at Bow Street.87 Each office received a brace of salaried
magistrates, clerks, and police officers. Like the unpaid JPs who continued
to sit on the commissions of the peace for London-area counties, the Lord
Mayor and aldermen of the City of London, and the magistrates at Bow
Street from which they drew much of their institutional inspiration, the
"police" or "stipendiary" magistrates conducted pretrial examinations in
cases of felony. But the magistrates who served in the police offices also
exercised an increasingly broad summary jurisdiction over various types
of petty theft-jurisdiction that, as the cases of Murray and Samuels attest,
could dispense with private victims altogether.
As far back as the late sixteenth century, magistrates in London had
seen fit to commit certain "pilferers" and "idle and disorderly persons" to
85. See ANONYMOUS, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND TIMES, OF SIR THOMAS DEVEIL, KNIGHT
(London, M. Cooper et al. 1748).
86. See J.M. Beattie, Sir John Fielding and Public Justice: The Bow Street Magistrates' Court,
1754-1780, 24 LAW & HIST. REv. (forthcoming 2007); John Styles, Sir John Fielding and the
Problem of Criminal Investigation in Eighteenth Century England, 33 TRANS. ROYAL HIST. SOC. 127
(5th ser. 1983); David Cox, "A Certain Share of Low Cunning": The Provincial Use and Activities of
Bow Street "Runners," 5 ERAS, http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/eras/edition_5/coxarticle.htm (last
visited Dec. 13, 2005). On the Office's initiatives in the realm of publication, see infra note 130.
87. Middlesex Justices Act, 1792, 32 Geo. 3, c. 53.
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the Bridewell for brief stints of incarceration.88 On occasion, as Beattie's
pioneering research demonstrates, metropolitan magistrates also
committed persons accused of more serious offenses such as
pickpocketing, house-breaking, and shop-lifting who, at least under formal
law, should have been committed for trial in the higher courts to face
charges of felony.89
During the course of the eighteenth century, Parliament increasingly
passed a series of measures designed to expand or clarify the summary
jurisdiction of magistrates in cases of petty theft--especially in London. In
1756, for example, Parliament enacted a measure designed to combat the
"pernicious practice" of stealing metal "in or upon houses, outhouses,
mills, warehouses, workshops, and other buildings" or located in "ships,
barges, lighters, boats, and other vessels." According to the statute's
preamble, officials had found it difficult to detect, prosecute, and convict
suspects because the thefts were committed "in such [a] close and
clandestine manner, that there can be no witness or witnesses to the same,
but such as who ...are partakers of the offence." Accordingly, the act
authorized constables to apprehend "every person ... who may reasonably
be suspected of having or carrying ...at any time after sun-setting, or
before sun-rising, any lead, iron, copper, brass, bell-metal, or solder,
suspected to be stolen, or unlawfully come by." If the suspect could "not
produce the party or parties from whom he ... [had] bought or received
the [metal], or some other credible witness to depose upon oath [its] sale
or delivery," he "[was to] be adjudged guilty" of a misdemeanor and fined.
Under the Lead and Iron Act, if the forfeited goods were not claimed from
local officials within thirty days, they were to be sold "for the best price
that can reasonably be had," with half of the proceeds going "to the person
or persons who .. .apprehend[ed]" the misdemeanant and the other half
"to the poor of the parish" where the offense was committed.9 °
Six years later, Parliament enacted the so-called "Bumboat Act," which
sought to deter the "many ill-disposed persons, using and navigating upon
the river Thames" who, "under pretence of selling liquors, . . . tobacco,
brooms, fruit, greens, gingerbread, and other such-like wares" to sailors,
attempted "to cut, damage, and spoil the cordage, cables, buoys, and buoy
ropes" of ships and to "fraudulently carry away the same." The statute
instructed constables and watchmen to arrest all persons "reasonably...
suspected of having or carrying, or in any way conveying, any ropes,
cordage, tackle, apparel, furniture, stores, materials, or any part of any
88. See BEATTIE, supra note 77, at 97; ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, PROSECUTION AND
PUNISHMENT: PETTY CRIME AND THE LAW IN LONDON AND RURAL MIDDLESEX, C. 1660-1725 (1991);
Paul Griffiths, Contesting London Bridewell, 1576-1580,42 J. BRIT. STUD. 283 (2003).
89. BEATTIE, supra note 77, at 28-29.
90. Lead and Iron Act, 1756, 29 Geo. 2, c. 30.
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cargo or lading, stolen or unlawfully procured from or out of any ship or
vessel" on the Thames. Officers who apprehended persons in these
circumstances were to convey the suspects before a Thames-area
magistrate. If the suspect failed to "produce the party or parties from
whom he ... [had] bought or received the [goods], or some credible
person, to depose upon oath the sale or delivery thereof, or [failed to] give
an account, to the satisfaction of such justice or justices, how he... came
by the same," he was to be convicted summarily and fined forty shillings
or, in default of payment, sentenced to a one-month term of imprisonment.
As with the Lead and Iron Act, successful prosecutors could be paid a
portion of the forfeited goods' value.9
On their face, these statutes (and others passed by Parliament that
defined theft-related misdemeanors) said nothing about dispensing with
private prosecutors. To the contrary, they typically included measures
designed to inform private property owners that their items had been
misappropriated and, accordingly, place them in a position to initiate a
criminal action. The act enacted by Parliament in 1756, by way of
example, required parish officials to seek to notify prospective owners of
property found in the possession of suspects by posting a description of
the property "in some publick paper" in London, causing "notice to be
given by some public cryer," and "fixing on the church or chapel door
notice describing such lead, iron, copper, brass, bell-metal, or solder."92
With this said, it is not clear how often magistrates actually sought to
identify the owners of property found in the possession of suspects,
especially where the goods were fungible and, as a result, the prospect of
identifying the true property owner was likely to have been remote. As the
cases of Murray and Samuels suggest, proceedings that required suspects
to "account" satisfactorily for their possession of suspicious goods
permitted magistrates to convict suspects even when private victims failed
to materialize. Evidence suggests that, by the mid-1830s, public officials
in London exercised extensive summary jurisdiction over persons
possessing (or formerly possessing) property in circumstances deemed to
be suspicious. As one police magistrate described to a parliamentary
subcommittee in 1837, London's police magistrates exercised summary
jurisdiction over persons "found conveying goods suspected to have been
stolen, and giving no satisfactory account of them," persons "found upon
search warrant in possession of property suspected to be stolen, and giving
no satisfactory account," and even those "appearing to have had prior
91. Bumboat Act, 1762, 2 Geo. 3, c. 28. Under the Lead and Iron Act, if the forfeited goods were
not claimed from local officials within 30 days, they were to be sold "for the best price that [could]
reasonably be had," with half of the proceeds going "to the person or persons who ... apprehend[ed]"
the misdemeanant and the other half "to the poor of the parish" where the offense was committed. 29
Geo. 2, c. 30, § 4.
92. 29 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 4.
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possession of property suspected to be stolen" but which they no longer
possessed. 93
Some statutes that conferred summary jurisdiction upon English
magistrates dispensed altogether with the pretense that a private property
owner had suffered actual harm, permitting magistrates to commit
suspects to local houses of correction even before any person had been
victimized. For example, so-called "Clause D" of the Middlesex Justices
Act of 1792-the statute that created the metropolitan police offices-
permitted police magistrates to convict summarily "persons of evil fame"
and "reputed thieves" upon the oath of one or more "credible witnesses" if
"there [was] just ground to believe that such person" was in an "avenue,
street, or highway" with intent to commit a felony and the suspect was
unable "to give a satisfactory account of himself. . . and of his way of
living." 94 Later, under the Vagrancy Act of 1824, magistrates were
authorized to convict summarily any "suspected person or reputed thief,
frequenting any river, canal, or navigable stream, dock, or basin, or any
quay, wharf, or warehouse near or adjoining thereto, or any street,
highway, or avenue leading thereto, or any place of public resort.., with
intent to commit felony," and to sentence the convicted offender to a
three-month term in the house of correction at hard labor.95 In such cases,
public officials arrested suspects and secured convictions in the absence of
any demonstrated harm to an actual victim.
Situations in which private victims appear to have been rendered largely
unnecessary are suggested by the following entries in the Police Gazette
from the 1820s and 1830s, all of which describe the arrests of persons
suspected of theft and their subsequent commitment to London-area
houses of correction:
WILLIAM LAWLER, and BENJAMIN HOLLAND, on suspicion of felony,
by Benjamin Ibberson, a Bow-street patrole. - Convicting of being
reputed thieves, and committed, for two months, to the House of
Correction, Cold Bath Fields.96
ROGER JUDGE, with stealing a piece of lead pipe, the property of
some person unknown: stopped in Stepney. - Discharged from the
felony; but committed to the House of Correction for one month, for
unlawfully possessing. 97
93. Letter from James Traill to Sir Benjamin Hawes, Chairman of the Police Comm. (Dec. 1,
1837), in SELECT COMM. APPOINTED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON METROPOLIS POLICE OFFICES,
REPORT 217 app. (1838) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1838 REPORT].
94. Middlesex Justices Act, 1792, 32 Geo. 3, c. 53.
95. Vagrancy Act, 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, § 4.
96. William Lawler and Benjamin Holland (Queen Square PO, 1828), POLICE GAZETTE, Feb. 26,
1828, microforned on The Police Gazette, pt. 2, reel 2 (Adam Matthew Pubs.).
97. Roger Judge (Lambeth Street PO, 1836), POLICE GAZETTE, Aug. 19, 1836, NA: HO 62/18.
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MATTHEW STERLING, with unlawfully possessing, in the West India
Docks, fourteen ounces weight of candles, which had been stolen. -
Convicted of a misdemeanor, and fined twenty shillings. 9
8
WESTBY STEEL, with possessing, in the London Docks, ten ounces
and a half weight of copper, which had been stolen. Convicted of a
misdemeanor, and fined five shillings. 99
WILLIAM PUNSTON, with possessing, on the Thames, twelve oranges
and four pounds weight of raisins, which had been unlawfully
obtained. - Convicted of a misdemeanor, and fined forty
shillings.) °
ABRAHAM BENDAHAM, with unlawfully possessing, at Whitechapel,
two hundred and sixteen pounds weight of lead, which had been
stolen. - Convicted of a misdemeanor, and fined forty shillings.'
0
'
In each of these cases, the suspect had been found in suspicious
circumstances with nondescript materials in his possession. In most, if not
all, of these cases, detection of the offense by the private victim and
identification of the goods by the true property owner likely would have
presented considerable, if not insuperable, challenges. Yet in a legal
regime that permitted suspects to be convicted when they failed to
"account" satisfactorily to a magistrate or when they were found to have
been loitering with "intent" to commit a felony, public officials had little
reason to wait for private victims to show up to complain or to testify.
This is not to suggest that private victims played no role in proceedings
conducted in the police offices. To the contrary, where property owners
managed to detect their losses, they regularly proceeded to the police
offices to complain. 102 In such cases, magistrates routinely conducted
pretrial examinations and committed persons to stand trial at the Old
Bailey. Private victims could play important roles even in cases that
magistrates resolved summarily. In February 1828, for example, the
attending magistrate at the Queen Square Police Office committed Henry
Welch to the house of correction at Cold Bath Fields as a "rogue and
vagabond" after Welch had been charged with "stealing a saw, the
property of James Christie, of No. 11, Robert's buildings, Pimlico,
98. Matthew Sterling (Thames PO, 1836), POLICE GAZETrE, Oct. 28, 1836, NA: HO 62/18.
99. Westby Steel (Thames PO, 1836), POLICE GAZETTE, Oct. 28, 1836, NA: HO 62/18.
100. William Punston (Thames PO, 1836), POLICE GAZETTE, Nov. 29, 1836, NA: HO 62/18.
101. Abraham Bendaham (Thames PO, 1836), POLICE GAZETTE, Dec. 5, 1836, NA: HO 62/18.
102. See, e.g., Ann and Thomas Baker, OBP (June 4, 1794) (t17940604-19) (victim went to the
Hatton Garden Police Office, secured a warrant, and had suspect searched); Ann Madden, OBP (Jan.
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carpenter."' 3 In that same month, the attending magistrate at the Hatton
Garden Police Office committed Charles Selby to the house of correction
for three months as a "reputed thief' upon "suspicion of stealing a pair of
boots, from Robert Downes, of Portpool-lane, Holborn."'' 0 4 In such cases,
the private victims not only appear to have been identified, but themselves
may have wished to proceed summarily rather than be bound over to
prosecute in the higher courts.'0 5 Other private individuals (described by
certain contemporaries as "common informers") initiated prosecutions in
the police offices not because they had been victimized, but because they
sought to secure the fees associated with successful summary
convictions. 10 6
It is certainly important to recognize the variety of "public" and
"private" modes in which summary proceedings might operate. Thus,
based on his study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rural Essex, King
has revealed that summary proceedings initiated by private victims
frequently resulted in private settlements between the complainant and the
accused.'0 7 Focusing on criminal procedure in London's police courts in
the second half of the nineteenth century, Jennifer Davis has stressed the
role of magistrates in resolving the private, interpersonal disputes of the
city's working poor.0 8 But in characterizing summary proceedings in the
police offices of metropolitan London, it is critically important to
recognize the extent to which summary proceedings augmented the roles
of public officials and diminished the involvement of private victims. As
the cases of Murray, Samuels, and the many others who were similarly
situated suggest, the prosecutorial role of public officials in the police
offices was often paramount.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION
Why did statutes that required suspects to "account" satisfactorily for
suspicious goods found in their possession, or that permitted magistrates
to convict persons found loitering "with intent," prove so appealing to
parliamentarians and criminal justice administrators alike? By increasingly
103. Henry Welch (Queen Square PO, 1828), POLICE GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 1828, microformed on
The Police Gazette, pt. 2, reel 2 (Adam Matthew Pubs.).
104. Charles Selby (alias Charles Sullivan) (Hatton Garden PO, 1828), POLICE GAZETTE, Feb.
26, 1828, microformed on The Police Gazette, pt. 2, reel 2 (Adam Matthew Pubs.).
105. In 1837, the police magistrate R.E. Broughton observed that he had "heard prisoners say
often, 'I wish your worship would dispose of it [i.e., the case] at once,' but not so often as the
prosecutors." 1838 REPORT, supra note 93, at 37-38.
106. In April 1837, for example, the Home Office received a series of testimonials from London-
area pawnbrokers complaining of the "very heavy penalties" imposed by magistrates based on the
"cupidity" of"common informers." Petition, Apr. 14, 1837, NA: HO 59/7.
107. KING, supra note 15, at 84-94.
108. Jennifer Davis, A Poor Man's System of Justice: The London Police Courts in the Second
Half of the Nineteenth Century, 27 HIST. J. 309 (1984).
[Vol 18:29
24
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss1/2
Smith
relying on public officials to detect offenses, arrest suspects, and initiate
cases, these statutes helped bring greater numbers of theft-related cases to
light. In turn, the evidentiary regime authorized by these statutes made it
easier to secure convictions in the cases that ultimately did emerge. In
short, summary proceedings in cases of suspected theft addressed each of
the defects in private prosecution identified in Part II above.
A. Detection
Writing in the 1820s, the influential English treatise writer Thomas
Starkie observed that statutes authorizing magistrates to adjudicate cases
summarily generally focused on "the protection of property much
exposed, and which ... is difficult to identify."' 9 Starkie understood that
statutes requiring persons to account satisfactorily for suspicious goods
found in their possession conferred particular benefits to criminal justice
administrators where detection was difficult. Although property owners
might be unable to detect petty thefts from their boats or warehouses, it
was at least conceivable that a police officer might notice a person
furtively paddling a boat stocked with marine stores or pushing a
wheelbarrow at night laden with metal.
By dispensing with the need for victims to detect such losses, statutes
that targeted unexplained possession provided considerable latitude to
constables and night watchmen. Indeed, as Clive Emsley has suggested,
the willingness of police officers in London to confront suspicious persons
on the streets and to initiate cases, even before the establishment of the
Metropolitan Police in 1829, invites a fundamental revision of the view
that law enforcement officials rarely responded to crime unless prompted
by private victims."11 As we have seen, our paradigmatic case of private
prosecution involving Granville Sharp itself involved the intervention of
an active and observant constable.1 ' Indeed, even in relatively sleepy
regions of rural England, constables routinely "stopped and searched"
suspicious persons, including "[v]agrants and travellers with suspicious-
looking bags."' 12
One reason that police officers (at least in London) did not merely wait
109. 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AND DIGEST OF
PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 840-41 (2d Am. ed. Boston, Wells & Lilly 1828).
110.
It is ... clear that at least in some metropolitan parishes there were determined attempts to
ensure that the night watch was competent and capable a hundred years before the Metropolitan
Police took to the streets [in 1829]. Some watchmen were fully prepared to stop men on
suspicion .... [E]vidence [from the 1810s] . .. suggests a watch system functioning in some
parts of the metropolis which possessed men behaving in the active and observant way that,
according to Whig historians, was introduced only with the new Metropolitan Police ....
EMSLEY, supra note 13, at 224.
111. See supra Part 1.
112. KING, supra note 15, at21.
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for the complaints of private victims is that these officers occasionally
sought to profit from the services they provided. In 1837, for example, the
salaried "surveyors" of the Thames Police Office complained to the Home
Office that pending legislation threatened a valuable source of their
funding: half the value of seizures that these officers secured under the
Lead and Iron Act and Bumboat Act. Although employed by the state,
these officers hoped to benefit, as well, from existing statutory
incentives.' 13 In such instances, officials did not wait passively for an
offense to be witnessed by a victim or for an arrest warrant backed by a
private complaint to be issued before confronting a suspect.
B. Arrest
Statutes granting summary jurisdiction also appear to have expanded the
powers of arrest possessed by police officers. Although constables
traditionally could not apprehend suspected misdemeanants without a
warrant, statutes extending summary jurisdiction typically dispensed with
this requirement." 4 Writing in 1960, Glanville Williams noted correctly
that measures such as the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839-a direct heir
to eighteenth-century statutes such as the Bumboat Act-permitted
officers to detain and search persons reasonably suspected of conveying
stolen goods without first making an arrest.' Although Williams
admitted that he failed to understand how such "detain and search" powers
were more helpful to police officers than their traditional powers to search
incident to an arrest, he noted that the English police officers that he
interviewed in the middle decades of the twentieth century considered the
distinction to be meaningful. Indeed, Williams surmised that the clearer
articulation by Parliament of a police officer's ability to "detain and
search" a suspect may have been even more important in the early decades
of the nineteenth century, at "a time when it was not clear how far the
police could search arrested persons." '116
113. Memorial from Thames Police Surveyors accompanying letter from W.J. Broderick &
William Ballantine to Home Office, Feb. 16, 1837, NA: HO 59/8 (calling for an alteration in Section
44 of the police act, which gave "the whole produce of the seizures therein mentioned to the Receiver
[i.e., a financial officer associated with the police offices]," although the Bumboat Act and Lead and
Iron Act had permitted the officers themselves to receive "one moiety [i.e., a half] of such produce").
114. "In cases of Misdemeanor, the Constable cannot apprehend the offender without a warrant."
CONSTABLE'S ASSISTANT, supra note 59, at 19.
115. Williams, supra note 62, at 598. In Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the
United States Supreme Court sought to determine the extent to which the Constitution permits police
officers to engage in warrantless arrests in minor criminal cases. In determining that an officer may
arrest an individual without a warrant for a misdemeanor seatbelt violation, provided probable cause
exists, Justice Souter cited a flurry of statutes from eighteenth-century England that permitted
warrantless arrests in cases of petty crimes. Id. at 335; see also Thomas Davies, The Fictional
Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-
Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239 (2002) (discussing
eighteenth-century English statutes that broadened powers of arrest).
116. Williams, supra note 62, at 606.
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If statutes conferring summary jurisdiction clarified the authority of
arresting officers, these statutes also targeted certain time-honored
techniques designed to frustrate prosecutions, such as tossing contraband
into the Thames." 7 The Thames Police Act, passed by Parliament in 1800,
declared that persons who "let fall" or "threw" into the Thames "any
materials, stores, or merchandizes" that previously had been the cargo of
any ship "for the purpose of preventing the seizure or discovery" of such
materials could be convicted summarily of a misdemeanor upon the
attending magistrate's "satisfaction" that the suspect's actions had not
"proceeded either from mere accident, or from some lawful cause."' 1 8
After 1800, although it still might prove impossible to arrest suspects with
illicit goods actually in their possession, persons suspected of theft could
be convicted for their evasive actions.
C. Case Initiation
As the cases of Murray and Samuels demonstrate, statutes that conferred
summary jurisdiction upon magistrates and required suspects to "account"
for possession permitted police officers to initiate prosecutions and to
provide the modest evidentiary predicate necessary to sustain them. In the
case of Murray, the officers who apprehended him appear to have initiated
the prosecution merely by swearing to the circumstances of Murray's
detection and apprehension.' 9 Similarly, despite Samuels's protestations
of innocence, the surviving evidence suggests that no private victim ever
emerged to testify against him either. 2 ' In such cases, as the police
magistrate Patrick Colquhoun crisply summarized in 1800, "the
Examination of the Delinquent" provided the sole evidence needed for
conviction.'12
D. Indictment and Trial
Summary proceedings, by their very nature, dispensed with both grand
and trial juries. By circumventing the former, summary proceedings
spared prosecutors the roughly one-in-six risk of failing to advance to
trial. 22 By bypassing the latter, prosecutors spared themselves the roughly
fifty percent rate of failure; by contrast, conviction rates in summary
117. This is not to suggest that efforts by suspected criminals to dispose of probative evidence is
unique to Hanoverian England. For a recent effort to address the problem of persons in police
detention swallowing drugs, see Drugs Act, 2005, c. 17, § 5.
118. Thames Police Act, 1800,40 Geo. 3, c. 87, § 15.
119. So much is at least suggested by the submission of the magistrates to the Home Office,
which stated that officers were eligible for a portion of a penalty when "the facts sworn to by them are
undisputed." Ballantine & Clarkson to Phillipps, supra note 79.
120. See sources cited supra notes 82-83.
121. COLQUHOUN,supra note 54, at 279.
122. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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proceedings in the metropolitan police offices in the 1830s stood at
roughly eighty percent. 12
3
During the 1840s and 1850s, the shift away from indictment and trial by
jury became even more pronounced. In those decades, Parliament passed a
series of statutes granting pairs of magistrates the authority to try cases of
simple larceny involving juveniles (1847 and 1850) and, later, adults
where the amount in controversy did not exceed five shillings (1855).124
Considered together, these statutes decisively and permanently altered the
balance in England between summary proceedings and proceedings upon
indictment in cases of petty theft.
V. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION BEFORE 1850
This Article has sought to identify a previously unexplored mechanism
by which public officials in London's police offices initiated and managed
prosecutions in ways that dramatically reduced the role of victims by
comparison to proceedings in the higher courts. How extensive was the
scope of this particular mode of public prosecution in the metropolitan
police offices?
Although a detailed answer to this question is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is possible to offer several general observations. 25 At the outset,
it is important to note that the state of the surviving records makes it
difficult to answer this question with any degree of certainty. The cases of
Murray and Samuels can be reconstructed because these individuals
petitioned the Home Office for relief. Yet while such petitions (and the
records associated with them) provide unique and invaluable insight into
the conduct of summary proceedings, these sources do not provide any
sense of the volume of similar cases over time. 26 Moreover, outside the
City of London, records relating to the day-to-day practices of London's
magistrates survive only sporadically before the mid-nineteenth century,
and virtually none relate to proceedings in the police offices. 127 Although
123. For data on conviction rates in summary proceedings, see Smith, supra note 12, at 159.
124. The three statutes were the Juvenile Offenders Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict., c. 82, the Juvenile
Offenders Act, 1850, 13 & 14 Vict, c. 37, and the Criminal Justice Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 126.
125. 1 intend to take up these quantitative issues in greater detail in a forthcoming book,
tentatively entitled Magistrates, Theft, and the Law in London, 1760-1860.
126. Although persons convicted summarily occasionally challenged their convictions--either by
appealing to London-area courts of quarter sessions or by petitioning the Home Office-such
challenges were relatively rare.
127. With the exception of letter books from the Thames Police Office, and related
correspondence in the Home Office papers of the National Archives, virtually no records associated
with the metropolitan police offices survive before 1850. Records of magisterial business in the City
of London, by contrast, are considerably more complete. Minutes Books from the Guildhall Justice
Room survive for the period 1752-96. See Guildhall Min. Bk., LMA: CLA/005/01/001 et seq.
Records from the Mansion House Justice Room survive from 1784 to 1821. See Mansion House Min.
Bk., LMA: CLA/004/02/001 et seq. Records relating to the practices of JPs in Middlesex survive for
scattered years before 1850. See, e.g., Lambeth Rotation Office Minute Book, 1791-92, LMA:
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three "calendars" recording summary convictions returned by magistrates
in Middlesex survive in the London Metropolitan Archives for the periods
1774-86, 1787-93, and 1794 , they shed little light on the relative roles of
private victims and public officials in the process of prosecution. 128 In
turn, contemporary quantitative estimates of magisterial business are also
lacking. For example, although Colquhoun estimated that London-area
magistrates had convicted 2,500 defendants under the Bumboat Act
between 1762 and 1800, it is impossible to confirm Colquhoun's estimate
or to determine the percentage of those convictions that were initiated and
managed predominately by public officials.
1 29
In the absence of detailed archival records chronicling procedures in the
police offices, historians seeking to estimate the number of prosecutions
initiated and conducted by officials associated with those institutions must
rely on other materials. One such source is The Police Gazette, which
includes brief entries recording the initial appearances of suspects in the
police offices, committals of suspects for purposes of reexamination, and
outcomes of summary proceedings themselves-most frequently, through
short-term committals to London-area houses of correction.
130
Unfortunately, the entries are so cursory that one cannot determine with
certainty the precise contributions of private individuals and public
officials to cases that are identified. What can be said is that The Police
Gazette and other contemporary sources document numerous cases similar
to those of Murray and Samuels, where suspects were arrested with
nondescript goods in their possession, where police officers seemingly
initiated the prosecutions, and where no private victim or complainant is
P.85/MR41/115; Magistrates Minute Book, St. Giles, Camberwell, 1818-26, LMA: P73/GIS/123;
Magistrates Examination Book, St. Luke, Chelsea, 1823-26, LMA: P74/LUK/154.
128. At best, the records provide a sense of the types of offenses that magistrates disposed of
summarily. Among the entries, offenses involving petty theft abound. There were the prosecutions of
Ann Lawless, "for unlawfully purloining one pound two ounces yellow Piedmont silk and three
pounds fourteen ounces of yellow Bengal silk;" of Richard Mills, for "having in his possession a
quantity of Russia Bar Iron suspected to have been stolen;" and of Daniel Jones, for "having in his
possession one tarpaulin and a quantity of old rope" stolen from a vessel on the Thames. See Ann
Lawless (Oct. 23, 1779); Richard Mills (Aug. 22, 1783); Daniel Jones (Feb. 11, 1785), LMA:
MSJ/CC/I (1774-86). Norma Landau sensibly refers to the returns as being "suspiciously low." Norma
Landau, The Trading Justice's Trade, in LAW, CRIME AND ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1660-1840, supra note
12, at 46, 66.
129. COLQUHOUN, supra note 54, at 47.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101. The Police Gazette originated in "information
sheets" published by Sir John Fielding in the I 770s. On the eighteenth-century origins of the Police
Gazette, see 3 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 12, at 47-54 (1957). In recent years, copies of the Police
Gazette that survive in English and Australian archives for the periods 1797-1840 and 1848-50 have
been made available on microfilm by Adam Matthew Publications. See Adam Matthew Publications,
The Police Gazette, Publisher's Note, http://www.adam-matthew-publications.co.uk/digital.guides/
police-gazette-part_2/Publishers-Note.aspx. Copies of the Police Gazette from 1828-39, including
portions for 1836 not contained in the existing microfilm series, can be found in the National Archives
in the series HO 62/1-22.
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Why have historians been so slow to recognize the important and
distinctive mode of public prosecution employed in London's police
offices-a mode of prosecution that emerged well before the creation of a
public prosecutor's office in England during the 1870s and even before the
supposed advent of "police prosecution" in the nation's higher criminal
courts during the 1840s and 1850s? 132
The most important reason for this neglect is that our legal-historical
knowledge of summary proceedings remains so incomplete-especially
with respect to London.' 33 Within the dimly lit realm of the city's police
offices, we continue to know very little about the ways that defendants
came before magistrates, the nature of the evidence that officers adduced,
or the types of arguments that suspects made. 134
Moreover, to the limited extent that historians have addressed the realm
of magisterial justice, they have tended to stress the role played by
summary proceedings in resolving disagreements between private
disputants. Thus, our leading scholar of summary proceedings has
analogized the magistrate's "central role" in such proceedings to that of an
"arbitrator or mediator."'' 35 But while summary proceedings, especially in
rural areas, often may have possessed an "arbitrational character," it is by
no means clear that such a characterization properly captures the dynamics
of cases like those of Murray and Samuels that were tried in the police
offices of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London. 136 In cases
where defendants confronted public officials, not private victims, the
proceedings arguably resembled plea bargaining more than arbitration. 137
In turn, historians who have sought to explain the comparatively late
131. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101. Contemporary newspaper reports of proceedings
in the police offices occasionally furnish detail not included in the Police Gazette. In March 1837, for
example, Thomas Murray published a detailed letter in The Times that described his efforts to seek
recovery of his confiscated lead from the Thames police magistrates. The letter also alluded to a libel
action filed by Murray against the unnamed publisher of "a morning journal," which resulted in a
financial settlement. See Thomas Murray, Letter to the Editor, TIMES (London), Mar. 23, 1837, at 6D.
132. Although the most comprehensive historical treatment of English prosecution in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century briefly addresses the role of the police in summary proceedings, the
discussion focuses largely on the period after 1850. See Davis, supra note 45. An important exception
to this generalization is the scholarship of Leon Radzinowicz, which emphasizes the extensive powers
exercised by officials at the Thames Police Office in the early decades of the nineteenth century. See 2
RADZINOWICZ, supra note 12, at 388-404 (1957). For commitments by magistrates at the Thames
Police Office, see supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
133. See supra text accompanying note 16.
134. Here, the perceptions of the accused may be the most difficult to reconstruct. As Hay has
observed, "those most subject to prosecutions, (were] not much given to publishing or otherwise
recording their thoughts." Hay, supra note 1, at 7.
135. KING, supra note 15, at 86.
136. ld. at 83.
137. For a brief analysis of summary proceedings and plea bargaining as alternative means of
bypassing trial by jury, see Bruce P. Smith, Plea Bargaining and the Eclipse of the Jury, I ANN. REV.
LAW& SOC. SCI. 131 (2005).
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development of public prosecution in England arguably have accepted the
rhetoric of contemporary participants too readily. Although opponents of
public prosecution frequently employed the rhetoric of civil liberties, it is
by no means clear that these putative libertarian concerns necessarily
outweighed others, such as the financial interest of the organized bar in
preventing inroads on their virtual monopoly over criminal prosecution.'38
As early as the 1780s, proponents of measures designed to establish a
salaried police and magistracy in London felt comfortable dismissing civil
libertarian opposition to their designs as self-interested cant. 39 Given that
opposition to "French"-style criminal justice administration in the 1780s
and 1790s did not prevent the creation of a professionalized police force
and magistracy in London, it is not surprising that outcry about civil
liberties failed to prevent public prosecution from emerging in the very
institutions where these salaried officers and magistrates toiled.
Finally, the inadequacies of the categories of "private" and "public"
have bedeviled efforts to characterize the extent of public participation in
prosecution before 1850. On the one hand, the stark dichotomy suggested
by these terms fails to capture the extent to which "public" and "private"
modes of prosecution were interrelated. As Cynthia Herrup has argued,
"[t]he most profitable framework for understanding English law
enforcement is not one built between opposing walls of private and public
control, but rather one that attempts to analy[z]e the continuous mixing of
private and public elements of authority."' 40 On the other hand, as Hay has
trenchantly observed, "[t]he difficulty of disentangling the actions of
[private] complainants from the actions of the police . . . has yet to be
resolved."'' Complicating matters further, as David Lieberman has
incisively noted, is the fact that "[e]ighteenth-century English law utilized
138. Tracts from the 1850s make clear that members of the organized bar figured prominently in
the opposition to public prosecution in that decade. For a particularly illuminating example, see SIR
LYTTELTON H. BAYLEY, THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: OR OBSERVATIONS ON THE REPORT FROM THE
SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 37 (London, Butterworths 1857) (criticizing "the
hasty and unjust scheme" to establish public prosecutors advocated by the previous year's
parliamentary subcommittee).
139. In 1786, for example, a defender of the government's initiative to establish salaried police
and magistrates in London derided the measure's critics as follows:
In defence of themselves they will talk of the dignity of... the Constitution .... [T]hey will say
it is novel to apprehend felons . .. in the night-that breaking open houses to search for felons
... is unlawful-that the whole is a French Police ... that those of his Majesty's subjects who
have the misfortune to reside in... London, will have no civil liberty remaining after such a Bill
is passed.
INHABITANT OF WESTMINSTER, DEFENCE OF THE POLICE BILL: IN ANSWER TO A CHARGE DELIVERED
BY W. MAINWARING, ESQ. 23-24 (London, John Stockdale 1786) (internal quotation omitted). For a
useful survey of objections to proposed reforms in the 1780s, see David Philips, "A New Engine of
Power and Authority ": The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in England 1780-1830, in CRIME
AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1500, supra note 58, at
155.
140. Herrup, Investigative Responses, supra note 54, at 829.
141. Hay, supra note 1, at 9.
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the terms 'private' and 'public' with a frequency and range sufficient to
frustrate any precise or simple definition."'12
With all of this said, however, the term "public," as Lieberman has
made clear, was "routinely" defined in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century England to "refer to the institutions and agents of state
authority."'43 Hired and supervised by the Home Office and paid by the
Treasury, the magistrates and police officers who worked in London's
police offices between 1792 and 1850 were critically important agents of
state authority. The efforts that they invested in investigating offenses,
arresting suspects, initiating cases, and securing convictions were "public"
in any practical and meaningful sense of the term.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION
What are the principal implications of this Article's findings for our
understanding of English criminal justice administration in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century?
For over a century, legal commentators have attributed England's
seeming resistance to public prosecution to the nation's supposedly
exceptional commitment to civil liberties.'" The notion has achieved
currency not only among historians of English criminal justice
administration, but among scholars in other fields as well. Struck by the
apparently profound differences between English- and American-style
prosecution in the period before 1850, Lawrence Friedman, our leading
historian of American law, has speculated that "the concept of public
responsibility for prosecuting criminals rang a bell in the colonial
[American] mind" that, for unknown reasons, failed to toll on the other
side of the Atlantic. 4 5 From a very different perspective, one scholar
associated with the law-and-economics movement has drawn the happy
libertarian lesson that "[c]rimes do not have to be prosecuted by police and
public prosecutors" in order to be dealt with successfully. 46
In truth, the English state involved itself in the process of prosecution
142. David Lieberman, Mapping the English Criminal Law: Blackstone and the Categories of
English Jurisprudence, in LAW, CRIME AND ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1660-1840, supra note 12, at 139, 157.
143. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
145. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1993).
146. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS To Do WITH LAW AND WHY
IT MATTERS 279 (2000); see also David D. Friedman, Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in
the Eighteenth Century, 1995 U. CI. LAW SCH. ROUNDTABLE 475 (1995). Other law-and-economics
studies that focus on "private" schemes of law enforcement, often with reference to the historical
English case, include Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public
Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980); and David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).
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considerably more than has previously been appreciated. As in so many
other areas during the "long eighteenth century," the English state
innovated, discovering more effective ways to wield its considerable
power. 47  Given the political sensitivity associated with "public"
prosecution, it is not surprising that English criminal justice administrators
vested prosecutorial power in public officials who toiled in tribunals
removed from the glare of the Old Bailey, and in a manner that permitted
contemporaries (and later historians) to cling to the illusion of "private"
prosecution.
This is not to say that the methods used by police officers to insinuate
themselves into the process of initiating and managing criminal
prosecutions in the police offices were necessarily confined to those low-
level tribunals. It is particularly interesting to discover that, in the early
decades of the nineteenth century, officers who had arrested persons with
suspicious goods in their possession were also occasionally securing
convictions at the Old Bailey in cases where it seems unlikely that private
victims could have been identified. 48 This suggests an intriguing, though
still untested, hypothesis: that the model of public prosecution that proved
so successful in the police offices may have spread, by the early decades
of the nineteenth century, from the police offices to the higher courts. If
so, we may be closer to understanding what is perhaps the most critical
prosecutorial development of the later nineteenth century: the rise of
"police prosecution" in the higher courts. 149
CONCLUSION
In a short, brilliant, and regrettably overlooked essay written in 1955,
Glanville Williams examined the curious survival in English legal theory
of the concept of "private" prosecution. Reflecting on the stark realities of
English criminal justice administration, Williams castigated lawyers and
legal commentators who claimed "absurdly" that England had no "public"
prosecutions, noting that those who denied that England had "a system of
public prosecution" denied it "on the verbal ground that a policeman or
147. Recent historical scholarship has stressed the considerable administrative capacity of the
English state during this period in other realms. For influential studies, see JOHN BREWER, THE
SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688-1783 (1990); LINDA COLLEY,
BRITONS: FORGING THE NATION 1707-1837 (1992); RETHINKING LEVIATHAN: THE EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY STATE IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY (John Brewer & Eckhart Hellmuth eds., 1999); and Philip
Harling & Peter Mandler, From Fiscal-Military State to Laissez-Faire State, 1760-1850, 32 J. BRIT.
STUDS. 44 (1993).
148. See, e.g., John Richardson, OBP (Oct. 23, 1822) (t18221023-79) (involving a prosecution
for stealing lead from "persons unknown" based upon the testimony of a watch superintendent and
another person who assisted in the arrest).
149. "The increasing role of the police as prosecutors from the middle of the nineteenth century
has been largely ignored by historians and there has been no detailed study, even on a regional basis,
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official who prosecute[d]" did so, as a matter of legal theory, "as a private
person and not in pursuance of any official power."'' 50 As Williams noted,
"a prosecution by a policeman or other official is brought in pursuance of
superior orders or under statutory authority and at public expence, so that
it is unreal to describe it as a private prosecution."151
For decades, students of English criminal justice administration have
confronted a perplexing question: Why did the English state tolerate for so
long its ramshackle and unreliable system of private prosecution? My
answer is deceptively simple: It didn't. More than thirty years ago,
Langbein observed trenchantly that the chief defect of private prosecution
was its unreliability; under a system of private prosecution, as he dryly
remarked, "[t]here will be cases where there are no aggrieved citizens who
survive to prosecute, and others where the aggrieved citizens will decline
to prosecute, or be inept at it." '52 By resorting to summary proceedings
that eased detection, aided apprehension, spurred the initiation of cases,
bypassed juries, and required suspects to "explain away" their guilt, the
English state developed a system of prosecution that addressed these
defects and, more strikingly, dispensed with private victims as well.
150. Glanville Williams, The Power To Prosecute (pt. 1), 1955 CRIM. L. REV. 596, 596, 603.
151. Id. at603.
152. Langbein, supra note 38, at 318.
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